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Abstract
Deep neural networks can now perform many tasks that were once thought to be
only feasible for humans. Unfortunately, while reaching impressive performance
under standard settings, such networks are known to be susceptible to adversarial
attacks – slight but carefully constructed perturbations of the inputs which drasti-
cally decrease the network performance and reduce their trustworthiness. Here we
propose to improve network robustness to input perturbations via an adversarial
training procedure which we call Adversarial Feature Desensitization (AFD). We
augment the normal supervised training with an adversarial game between the
embedding network and an additional adversarial decoder which is trained to dis-
criminate between the clean and perturbed inputs from their high-level embeddings.
Our theoretical and empirical evidence acknowledges the effectiveness of this
approach in learning robust features on MNIST, CIFAR10, and CIFAR100 datasets
– substantially improving the state-of-the-art in robust classification against previ-
ously observed adversarial attacks. More importantly, we demonstrate that AFD
has better generalization ability than previous methods, as the learned features
maintain their robustness against a large range of perturbations, including per-
turbations not seen during training. These results indicate that reducing feature
sensitivity using adversarial training is a promising approach for ameliorating the
problem of adversarial attacks in deep neural networks.
1 Introduction
Recent progress in deep learning has allowed neural network models to achieve a near human-level
performance across a range of complex tasks [16, 31, 39, 46]. However, while the number of
applications of deep learning is growing fast, these systems are often not very robust. In particular,
their vulnerability to adversarial attacks [44] has critically diminished the public trust in these
systems. Adversarial attacks are small but precise perturbations made to the inputs of a system,
resulting in high-confidence predictions which are critically divergent from human judgement.
It has been shown that many adversarial perturbations that are often small in magnitude lead to
large deviations in the high-level features of deep neural networks [50]. In addition, previous work
demonstrated that adversarial patterns often rely on specific learned features which generalize even
on large datasets such as Imagenet [17]. However, these features are highly sensitive to input changes,
yielding a potential vulnerability that can be exploited by adversarial attacks. While humans can
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Figure 1: Overview of the proposed approach (left) visual comparison of different adversarial
robustness methods. Adversarial training [26], TRADES [52], and AFD. The dotted line corresponds
to the decision boundary of the adversarial decoder (right) schematic of AFD paradigm.
also experience altered perception in response to particular visual patterns (e.g., visual illusions1),
they are seemingly insensitive to this particular class of perturbations, and often unaware of the
subtle image changes resulting from adversarial attacks. This in turn suggests that current artificial
neural networks rely on visual features that are still considerably different from those giving rise to
perception in primates (and, particularly, in humans) – even despite many recent studies highlighting
their remarkable similarities [49, 20, 2]. It is therefore reasonable to hypothesize that a deep network
may become more robust to such adversarial attacks if the corresponding higher-level representations
(features, embeddings) are more robust to input perturbations, similar to those used by our brains,.
One way to approach the question of feature/embedding robustness is to use a relatively simple
classifier (e.g. a linear transformation) that produces predictions based on such embedding — if the
embedding is robust then the predictions from the simple classifier would consequently be robust too.
We use this approach below to develop our technique for improved embedding robustness.
Formally, for a given embedding function E (for example, the activations before the last linear layer
in a deep neural network), we define the embedding sensitivity e as the maximum change in the
embedding given input perturbations δ of maximum size i:
∀x ∈ X , ‖δ‖ ≤ i; max
δ
‖E(x)− E(x+ δ)‖ ≤ e (1)
Following the above reasoning, we wish to discourage the embedding from learning over-sensitive
features (e  0) because a representation devoid of over-sensitive features will only gradually
change in response to input variations and will not allow drastic changes in the category judgments
derived from it. However in practice, achieving full embedding robustness under equation (1) might
be difficult. On the other hand, from the point of view of category judgements, some embedding
sensitivity could still be acceptable as long as it would not lead to drastic changes in the category
judgements. Such that, given a decoding function Dc:
∀x ∈ X , ‖δ‖ ≤ i : max
δ
‖Dc(E(x))−Dc(E(x+ δ))‖ ≤ Kδ (2)
which provides a formulation of the problem that is similar to the Lipschitz continuity and where we
desire K to be small.
In principal, drastic changes in category judgements could occur under at least one of the following
two conditions: i) when K is relatively small but the class manifolds are close to each other in the
embedding space; ii) when class manifolds are reasonably apart but points in the embedding space
can have gradients that are large enough to allow the feature values to essentially teleport from the
manifold of one class to another (i.e. when K  0).
Many prior work on adversarial robustness have tackled the robust classification problem by pushing
the embedding of training samples from different categories farther from the decision boundary
[26, 18, 52], which has been shown to lead to significant improvement in adversarial robustness
given a specific perturbation. For example, in Adversarial Training procedure [26], network is trained
1https://michaelbach.de/ot/
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to optimize the classification loss on the perturbed inputs or in combination with clean inputs. Or
another recent approach called TRADES [52] augments the classification loss on clean inputs with
an auxiliary term that matches the assigned labels to clean and perturbed inputs (Figure-1). However
neither of these methods address the potential issues that may rise under the second condition
mentioned above (i.e. when the embedding could exhibit sharp changes in response to small input
perturbations that could still lead to crossing the classification boundary). On the other hand, several
other works attempted to improve robustness by enhancing the flatness of the classification loss
[47, 34], which demonstrated that this approach will also lead to more robust performance against
white-box attacks.
Here, instead of focusing on robust classification, we turned our attention to robustness of learned
features from which the categories are inferred (e.g. using a simple linear classifier). Ideally,
we want the learned embeddings to remain stable in the presence of small adversarial or non-
adversarial perturbations. We propose to improve the robustness of network embeddings to adversarial
perturbations via an adversarial game between two agents. In this setup, the first adversarial agent
(i.e. the attacker) searches for performance-degrading perturbations given the embedding function.
On the other hand, the second agent uses a decoder function to discriminate between the clean and
perturbed inputs from their high-level embeddings. The parameters of the embedding and (adversarial)
decoding functions are then tuned via an adversarial game between the two (Figure-1). This paradigm
is similar to the adversarial learning paradigm widely used in image generation and transformation
[14, 19, 54], unsupervised and semi-supervised learning [30], video prediction [27, 23], domain
adaptation [13, 45], active learning [40], and continual learning [12].
In summary, our main contributions are as follows:
• We introduce a method to improve the robustness of learned features in an embedding
network through an adversarial game between the embedding network and a secondary
decoding network.
• We theoretically demonstrate that under some assumptions on the nature of the adversarial
attacker, this approach leads to a flat likelihood function in the vicinity of training samples.
• We empirically confirm that the proposed feature desensitization approach leads to learning
a sparse and robust set of high-level features and consequently a more stable classifier.
2 Methods
Let E(x) : RNi → RNe be an embedding of the input x with Ni inputs and Ne embeddings, and
Dc : RNe → RNc be a linear function that when applied on the embedding E(x) outputs the
likelihood of possible labels given the input x: lˆi(x) = softmax
(
Dc(E(x))
)
, i ∈ {1, ..., Nc}. Let
pi(x, ) be a perturbation which operates on input x:
∀x ∈ X : pi(x, ) = x′ ∈ B(x, );B(x, ) = {x′ ∈ X : ‖x′ − x‖ < } (3)
which finds perturbations within the  neighborhood of input x such that:
argmaxi lˆi(x) 6= argmaxi lˆi(x′) (4)
Given any model, there are at least two conditions under which a perturbation method pi could
drastically increase the likelihood of the non-target class. i) there are short paths from points on the
manifold of one class to another; ii) there are points on the manifold of one class with large gradients
in the direction of another class. Notably, under the second condition, it is possible for the manifolds
of two classes to be far from each other but still the underlying embedding space to be non-robust.
Ideally we want a network to learn an embedding that remains stable in the presence of any small
perturbations while considering both of the above possible situations. Consequently, to learn such an
embedding, one needs to not only increase the distance between manifolds of different classes, but
also to reduce the magnitude of gradients from points on the manifold of each class in the direction of
other classes.
In that regard, several prior studies have explored different approaches towards increasing the distance
between class manifolds [26, 52]. These approaches lead to substantial increase in robust performance
against adversarial perturbations. However, they commonly suffer from sudden dives in performance
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with slight increments to the strength of perturbations or by being exposed to a different class of
perturbations [38, 41].
We posit that the landscape of gradients in the learned embedding space is equally important for
the robustness of model’s performance against adversarial perturbations and hypothesize that the
failure of previous approaches in generalizing the robust performance to higher perturbation degrees
may be (at least partly) due to the potentially large likelihood gradients that remain unconstrained.
We propose an adversarial learning procedure to reduce the sensitivity of the learned embedding
with respect to the input. Algorithm 1 summarizes the proposed approach. The training procedure
involves three loss functions that are optimized sequentially. First, parameters of the embedding Eθ
and category decoder Dcφ are tuned to minimize the categorization softmax entropy loss. Second,
parameters of the adversarial decoder Daψ are tuned to minimize the cross-entropy loss associated
with discriminating natural and perturbed inputs conditioned on the natural labels. Lastly, parameters
of the embedding Eθ are adversarially tuned to maximize the cross-entropy from the second step.
The adversarial training framework is similar to that used in training conditional GANs, in which E
and Da networks play a two-player minimax game with value function V (E,Da):
V (E,Da) = Ep(y)
[
Ep(x|y)[S(−Da(E(x), y))]
]
+ Eq(y)
[
Eq(x|y)[S(Da(E(x), y))]
]
(5)
where p and q correspond to natural and perturbed distributions, and S denotes the softplus function.
Following the logic presented in [14, 7] we reason that the global minimum of the adversarial training
criterion V (E,Da) is achieved if and only if p = q and the embedding of natural and perturbed
images conditioned on the class label are indistinguishable from each other:
P (E(x), y) = P (E(x′), y) (6)
If this is the case, then a Bayes optimal classifier will achieve the same error rate on the perturbed
inputs as it will on the natural inputs. We use this fact below to prove that when V (E,Da) is at
the global minimum, the partial derivatives of the linear output with respect to the input in the
perturbation direction are zero, i.e. the gradient is flat in the direction of the other classes.
Theorem 1. Given an embedding function E(x), class-likelihood functions Dci, i ∈ {1, ...,K}:
lˆi(x) = softmax
(
Dci(E(x))
)
, a perturbation function pi(x) = x− ∂lˆt∂x where t denotes the target
(true) class index, if the adversarial optimization of embedding and discriminator functions E and
Da converges to its global minimum of the training criterion, then ∂lˆt∂x |x=xi = 0.
Proof. Assume Dci, i ∈ {1, ...,K} is a set of differentiable functions that implement the Bayes
optimal classifier from the E(x) embedding.
yˆ = argmaxi lˆi
lˆi = P (yi|x) = softmax
(
Dci(E(x))
)
, yi ∈ {1, ...,K}
(7)
Assuming that the adversarial training of E and Da converge to the global minimum, we have:
∀x ∈ X , y ∈ Y : P (E(x), y) = P (E(pi(x)), y) (8)
Following from Bayes rule we have:
P (yi = t|E(xi))P (E(xi)) = P (yi = t|E(xi − δ))P (E(xi − δ)), δ = ∂lˆt
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=xi
(9)
From equation 8, the marginal distributions P (E(xi)) and P (E(xi − δ)) should be equal which
leads to:
P (yi = t|E(xi)) = P (yi = t|E(xi − δ)) (10)
which can only be true if ∂lˆt∂x |x=xi = 0.
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Algorithm 1: AFD training procedure
Input: Perturbation pi, batch size m, optimizer O, encoding network Eθ, adversarial decoder
network Daψ , category decoder network Dcφ, softplus function S.
Read mini-batch B = {(x1, y1), ..., (xm, ym)}
repeat
x′ ← pi(x,Eθ, Dcφ)
LEDc = − 1m
∑m
i=1 log
(
softmax(−Dcφ(Eθ(xi)), yi)
)
LDa = 1m
∑m
i=1
[
S(−Daψ(Eθ(xi))) + S(Daψ(Eθ(x′i)))
]
LE = 1m
∑m
i=1 S(−Daψ(Eθ(x′i)))
θ, φ← O(θ, φ,∇θ,φLEDc)
ψ ← O(ψ,∇ψLDa)
θ ← O(θ,∇θLE)
until training converged;
While the assumption of convergence to global optimum is a strong assumption, in practice, it is
possible to derive a bound on the classifier’s robust error in terms of its error on clean inputs and a
divergence measure between the clean and perturbed embeddings (see 8.3 in the appendix).
3 Experiments
3.1 Adversarial perturbations
We used a range of adversarial perturbations in our experiments, using existing implementations in
the Foolbox [35] and Advertorch [9] packages. We validated the models against Projected Gradient
Descent (PGD) [26] (L∞, L2, L1), Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [15], Momentum Iterative
Method (MIM) [10], Decoupled Direction and Norm (DDN) [36], Deepfool [32], and C&W [5]
perturbations. For each perturbation, we swept the  value across a wide range and validated different
models on each. Specific settings used for each perturbation are listed in Table-A3.
3.2 Adversarial robustness
We validated our approach on learning robust visual embeddings on the MNIST[22], CIFAR10, and
CIFAR100[21] datasets. We used projected gradient descent with L∞ constraint to perturb the inputs
during training.  was set to 0.3 and 0.031 for MNIST and CIFAR datasets respectively. We used the
activations before the last linear layer as the high-level embedding produced by the network. In all
experiments, the adversarial decoder network (Da) consisted of three fully connected layers with
Leaky ReLU nonlinearity followed by a projection discriminator layer that incorporated the labels
into the adversarial decoder through a dot product operation [29]. The number of hidden units in all
layers were equal (200 for MNIST and 512 for CIFAR10). We used spectral normalization [28] on
all layers of Da. Further details of training for each experiment are listed in Table-A2. We used our
own re-implementation of adversarial training (AT) method [26] and the official code for TRADES2
[52] and denoted these results with † in the tables.
Adversarial robustness against observed attack We first evaluated our approach against the same
class and strength of attack that was used during training. Table-1 compares the robust classification
performance of our proposed approach against PGD L∞ (with similar setting as was used during
training) and FGSM attacks. Training LeNet with AFD was unstable leading to frequent crashing
of adversarial decoder accuracy despite our extensive hyperparameter search. For this reason, we
conducted our MNIST experiments using a very shallow ResNet architecture which we call ResNet5.
This architecture consisted of only one convolution, one ResNet block, and a fully connected layer
with a total depth of 5 layers (Table-A1). AFD-trained ResNet5 was less robust compared to AT
against PGD-L∞ and FGSM with default strength. On the other hand, on CIFAR10 and CIFAR100
datasets, ResNet18 network trained with AFD performed much higher than all other methods against
both white-box and black-box attacks.
2https://github.com/yaodongyu/TRADES.git
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Table 1: Accuracy against different perturbations and methods on MNIST, CIFAR10, and CIFAR100
datasets. Both PGDL∞ and FGSM perturbations were constrained by  = 0.3 for MNIST and  =
8
255
for CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 datasets. † indicates replicated results using our reimplementation or
official code. NT: natural training; AT: adversarial training; AFD: adversarial feature desensitization;
WB: white-box attack; BB: black-box attack. Numbers reported with µ ± σ denote mean and std
values over three independent runs with different random initialization. * RST[6] additionally uses
500K unlabeled images during training.
Method Dataset Network Clean PGDL∞ (WB) FGSM (WB) PGDL∞ (BB) FGSM (BB)
NT†
MNIST
LeNet 98.88 0 0.45 0 0.44
AT[26] LeNet 98.8 93.2 95.6 96.0 96.8
TRADES[52] LeNet 99.48 96.07 - - -
ATES[41] LeNet 99.11 94.04 - - -
ABS[38] LeNet 99.0 13 34 - -
NT† RN5 98.81±0.03 2.03±0.23 9.72±0.01 2.08±0.16 9.74±0.0
AT[26]† RN5 99.15±0.07 94.98±0.09 97.1±0.11 98.96±0.05 98.92±0.08
TRADES[52]† RN5 97.72±0.11 89.87±0.87 95.18±1.02 96.88±0.4 95.08±1.49
AFD RN5 98.49±0.16 92.75±0.32 95.95±0.46 98.11±0.25 97.97±0.25
NT†
CIFAR10
RN18 95.40 0.12 47.79 12.00 54.65
AT[26] RN18 87.3 45.8 56.1 86.0 85.6
AT[26]† RN18 83.58 41.05 50.12 83.20 82.88
TRADES[52] RN18 84.92 56.61 - - -
TRADES[52]† RN18 82.22 52.30 58.16 80.36 79.69
ATES[41] WRN-34-10 86.84 55.06 - - -
RLFAT[43] WRN-32-10 82.72 58.75 - - -
RST+[47, 6]∗ WRN-34-10 89.82 64.86 69.60 88.77 87.61
LLR[34] WRN-28-8 86.83 52.99 - - -
AFD RN18 87.83 72.45 76.43 86.28 85.06
NT†
CIFAR100
RN18 76.12 0.01 9.67 1.55 15.43
AT[26]† RN18 55.78 20.39 25.09 53.83 53.25
TRADES[52]† RN18 55.48 27.36 30.46 54.13 53.16
RLFAT[43] WRN-32-10 56.70 31.99 - - -
AFD RN18 62.54 49.89 51.36 58.95 56.59
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Figure 2: Robust classification performance of different methods against various degrees of PGD-L∞
attack on different datasets.
Robust classification against stronger and unseen attacks We also tested the network robustness
against higher degrees of the same attack used during training as well as to a suite of other (unobserved)
attacks. We found that the AFD-trained networks continued to perform relatively well against white-
box attacks even for very large perturbations – while performance of other methods went down to
zero relatively quickly (Figures-2,A2,A3,A4). The AFD-trained network also performed remarkably
well against most other perturbation methods that were not observed during training. To compare
different models considering both attack types and perturbation strength, we computed the area-under-
the-curve (AUC) for a range of epsilons for each attack and each approach. Table-2 summarizes these
values for our approach and two alternative approaches (adversarial training and TRADES).
Embedding Stability We compared the robustness of the learned embedding derived from training
the same architecture using different methods. For that we measured the normalized sensitivity of
the embeddings in each network as ‖E(x)−E(x
′)‖2
‖E(x)‖2 . For all three datasets we found that AFD-trained
network learns high-level features that are more robust against input perturbations as measured by
the normalized L2 distance between clean and perturbed embeddings (Figures-A1,A6,A7,A8).
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Table 2: AUC measures for different perturbations and methods on MNIST, CIFAR10, and CIFAR100
datasets. AUC values are normalized to have a maximum allowable value of 1. Evaluations on AT
and TRADES were made on networks trained using reimplemented or official code.
Dataset Model PGDL∞ PGDL2 PGDL1 FGSM MIM DDN DeepFool C&W
MNIST
NT (RN5) 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.18 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.23
AT (RN5) 0.64 0.22 0.20 0.67 0.64 0.45 0.42 0.84
TRADES (RN5) 0.63 0.21 0.14 0.69 0.65 0.45 0.40 0.84
AFD (RN5) 0.73 0.33 0.28 0.73 0.64 0.46 0.40 0.76
CIFAR10
NT (RN18) 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.25 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.10
AT (RN18) 0.27 0.05 0.07 0.31 0.29 0.06 0.18 0.26
TRADES (RN18) 0.34 0.06 0.08 0.33 0.36 0.06 0.25 0.32
AFD (RN18) 0.71 0.32 0.53 0.74 0.73 0.34 0.15 0.25
CIFAR100
NT (RN18) 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.08
AT (RN18) 0.15 0.03 0.04 0.12 0.15 0.04 0.09 0.14
TRADES (RN18) 0.19 0.04 0.05 0.15 0.18 0.04 0.11 0.17
AFD (RN18) 0.48 0.18 0.33 0.50 0.50 0.15 0.07 0.11
Figure 3: Logarithm of the average gradient magnitudes of class likelihoods with respect to input,
evaluated at samples within the test set of each dataset (log
(
Ex∼X
(
∂yˆt
∂x |x=xi
))
). For each matrix,
rows correspond to target (true) labels and columns correspond to non-target labels.
Learning a sparse embedding We compared the number of embedding dimensions learned by
applying different methods on the same architecture using two measures. i) number of non-zero
units over the test set within each dataset and ii) number of PCA dimensions that explains more than
99% of the variance in the embedding computed over the test-set of each dataset. We found that the
same network architecture when trained with AFD method gave rise to a much sparser and lower
dimensional embedding space (Table-A5). The embedding spaces learned with AFD on MNIST,
CIFAR10, and CIFAR100 datasets had only 4, 7, and 88 principal components respectively.
Gradient landscape To empirically validate our proposed theorem, we computed the average gradient
of each predicted class with respect to the input across samples within the test set of each dataset
(‖∇x lˆi‖, i ∈ 1, ...,K). We found that, on all datasets, the magnitude of gradients in the direction
of most non-target classes were much smaller for AFD-trained network compared to other tested
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methods (Figure-3). This confirms that AFD stabilizes the embedding in a way that significantly
reduces the gradients towards most non-target classes.
Matching vs. Indiscrimination We also ran additional experiments on the MNIST dataset in which
we added a regularization term to the classification loss to minimize the L2 distance between the clean
and perturbed embeddings. We observed that although this augmented loss improved the network
robustness against different white box attacks, it showed only weak generalization to higher strength
and other unseen perturbations (Figure-A5). This result suggests that enforcing a distributional form
of feature desensitization (e.g. AFD) may lead to robust behavior over a larger range of perturbations
compared to the case where feature stability is directly enforced through an Lp norm measure.
Non-obfuscated gradients Recent literature have pointed out that many defense methods against
adversarial perturbations could drive the network into a regime called obfuscated gradients in which
the network appears to be robust against common iterative adversarial attacks but could easily be
broken using black-box or alternative attacks that do not rely on exact gradients [33, 1]. We believe
that our results are not due to obfuscated gradients for several reasons. i) For most perturbations,
the model performance continues to decrease with increased epsilon (Figures-A2,A3,A4); ii) The
iterative perturbations were consistently more successful than single-step ones (Table-1); iii) Black-
box attacks were significantly less successful than white-box attacks (Table-1); iv) The AFD-trained
model performed similar or better than alternate methods against the Boundary attack [4] – an attack
which does not rely on the network gradients (Table-A4).
4 Related Work
There is an extensive literature on mitigating susceptibility to adversarial perturbations. Adversarial
training [26] is one of the earliest successful attempts to improve robustness of the learned represen-
tations to potential perturbations to the input pattern by solving a "saddle point" problem composed
of an inner and outer adversarial optimization. A number of other works suggest additional losses
instead of direct training on the perturbed inputs. TRADES [52] adds a regularization term to the
cross-entropy loss which penalizes the network for assigning different labels to natural images and
their corresponding perturbed images. [34] proposed an additional regularization term (local linearity
regularizer) that encourages the classification loss to behave linearly around the training examples.
[47] proposed to regularize the flatness of the loss to improve adversarial robustness.
Our work is closely related to the domain adaptation literature in which adversarial optimization has
recently gained much attention [13, 24, 45]. From this viewpoint one could consider the clean and
perturbed inputs as two distinct domains for which a network aims to learn an invariant feature set.
Although in our setting, i) the perturbed domain continuously evolves while the parameters of the
embedding network are tuned; ii) unlike the usual setting in domain-adaptation problems, here we
have access to the labels associated with samples from the perturbed (target) domain. Despite this,
[42] regularized the network to have similar logit values in response to clean and perturbed inputs
and showed that this additional term leads to better robust generalization to unseen perturbations.
Related to this, Adversarial Logit Pairing [18] increases robustness by directly matching the logits
for clean and adversarial inputs.
Another line of work is on developing certified defenses which consist of methods with provable
bounds over which the network is certified to operate robustly [53, 51, 8]. While these approaches
provide a sense of guarantee about the proposed defenses, they are usually prohibitively expensive
to train, drastically reduce the performance of the network on natural images, and the empirical
robustness gained against standard attacks are low.
5 Discussion
We proposed a method to decrease the sensitivity of learned embeddings in neural networks using
adversarial optimization. Decreasing the input-sensitivity of features has long been desired in training
neural networks [11] and has been suggested as a way to improve adversarial robustness [37]. Our
results show that AFD can be used to reduce the sensitivity of network features to input perturbations
and to improve robustness against a family of adversarial attacks. We believe that these results could
further be improved by i) using larger neural networks such as wider or deeper networks as is shown
in recent work [48, 26]; ii) by applying the adversarial learning paradigm on multiple feature layers
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of the network; iii) by combining AFD with other methods like adversarial training [26] or TRADES
[52].
6 Broader Impact
As the application of deep neural networks becomes more common in everyday life, security and
dependability of these networks becomes more crucial. While these networks excel at performing
many complicated tasks under standard settings, they often are criticized for their lack of reliability
under broader settings. One of the main points of criticism of today’s artificial neural networks is on
their vulnerability to adversarial patterns – slight but carefully constructed perturbations of the inputs
which drastically decrease the network performance.
Our work presented here proposes a new way of addressing this important issue. Our approach
could be used to improve the robustness of learned representation in an artificial neural network
and as shown lead to a recognition behavior that is more aligned with the human judgement. More
broadly, the ability to learn robust representations and behaviors is highly desired in a wide range of
applications and disciplines including perception, control, and reasoning and we expect the presented
work to influence the future studies in these areas.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Network architectures
MNIST: We ran our experiments on a shallow ResNet architecture [16] which we called ResNet5.
The ResNet5 architecture consists of 1 convolutional layer with stride 2 and 32 filters, a batch
normalization layer and ReLU nonlinearity followed by a ResNet block (v1) with stride 2 and 64
filters, global average pool and a ReLU FC layer with 200 units (Table-A1). Activations before the
last linear layer were used as high-level network embedding. Objective function was optimized using
SGD algorithm with 0.9 momentum.
Table A1: ResNet5 architecture.
Input (1x28x28)
Conv2D (32, stride=2)
BatchNorm2D (32)
ReLU
ResNet Block (64, stride=2)
Global Average Pool (7x7)
FC (200)
ReLU
FC (10)
CIFAR10 and CIFAR100: We trained the ResNet18 architecture [16] using SGD optimizer with
0.8 momentum and learning rates as indicated in Table-A2, weight decay of 10−4, batch size of 64,
for 850 epochs. All learning rates were reduced by a factor of 10 after epochs 350 and 700.
Table A2: Training hyperparameters for each dataset and network.
Dataset Model LRE LRDa LREDc weight decay batch size Num. Epochs
MNIST ResNet5 0.5 0.1 0.1 10−4 50 300
CIFAR-10 ResNet18 0.5 0.1 0.1 10−4 64 850
CIFAR-100 ResNet18 0.5 0.1 0.1 10−4 64 850
8.2 Adversarial attacks
We used a range of adversarial attacks in our experiments. Hyperparameters associated with each
attack are listed in the table below. Implementation of these attacks were adopted from Foolbox [35],
AdverTorch [9] packages.
8.3 Bound on classifier’s robust error
Considering the embedding distributions in response to clean and perturbed inputs (of a particular
class) as two distinct domains of inputs, it is straight forward to use the math from domain adaptation
literature to derive a bound on the classifier’s robust error (i.e. under the perturbed scenario). In this
case, we can directly adapt Theorem 2 in [3] to derive this bound.
If Dc and Dp are distributions of embeddings in response to clean and perturbed inputs of a particular
class yi respectively. Let Uc and Up be samples of size m each, drawn from Dc and Dp. LetH be a
hypothesis space of VC dimension d, then for any δ ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1-δ (over the
choice of the samples), for every h ∈ H:
p(h) ≤ c(h) + 1
2
dˆH∆H(Uc,Up) + 4
√
2dlog(2m) + log( 2δ )
m
+ λ
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Table A3: Attack hyperparameters for each dataset and attack.
Attack Dataset Steps  More Toolbox
FGSM MNIST 1 [0, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5, 0.8] - Foolbox
CIFAR [0, 2255 ,
4
255 ,
8
255 ,
16
255 ,
32
255 ,
64
255 ] -
PGD-L1
MNIST 50 [0, 10, 50, 100, 200, 400] step=0.025 FoolboxCIFAR
PGD-L2
MNIST 50 [0, 2, 5, 10, 20] step=0.025 FoolboxCIFAR
PGD-L∞
MNIST 40 [0.0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.8, 1] step=0.033 Foolbox
CIFAR 20 [0, 2255 ,
4
255 ,
8
255 ,
16
255 ,
32
255 ] step=
2
255
MIM MNIST 40 [0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.8, 1] - AdverTorch
CIFAR [0, 2255 ,
4
255 ,
8
255 ,
16
255 ,
32
255 ] -
DDN MNIST 100 [0, 1, 2, 5, 10] - FoolboxCIFAR [0, 2, 5, 10, 15] -
Deepfool MNIST 50 [0, 0.01, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 1] - Foolbox
CIFAR [0, 2255 ,
4
255 ,
8
255 ,
16
255 ,
32
255 ,
64
255 ] -
C&W MNIST 100 [0, 1, 2, 5] stepsize=0.05 FoolboxCIFAR
where c and p are the errors on clean and perturbed inputs, dˆH∆H is the empiricalH-divergence
[3], and λ is the is the combined error of the ideal hypothesis h∗: λ = c(h∗) + p(h∗).
Table A4: Comparison of robust performance against Boundary attack [4] with 5000 steps and  = 1
on different datasets using various methods. We tested the robust performance of each model on 100
random samples from each dataset’s test-set.
Dataset Model Method Boundary Attack
MNIST RN5
NT 6
AT 98
TRADES 98
AFD 95
CIFAR10 RN18
NT 12
AT 66
TRADES 72
AFD 74
CIFAR100 RN18
NT 8
AT 43
TRADES 43
AFD 45
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Table A5: Dimensionality of the learned embedding space on various datasets using different methods
and measures. Units: number of non-zero embedding dimensions over the test-set within each dataset.
Dims: number of PCA dimensions that account for 99% of the embedding variance across all images
within the test-set of each dataset.
Dataset MNIST CIFAR10 CIFAR100
Network RN5 RN18 RN18Units Dims Units Dims Units Dims
NT 173 13 512 24 512 431
AT 153 27 512 455 512 481
TRADES 156 52 512 349 512 461
AFD 31 4 380 7 490 88
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Figure A1: Comparison of normalized embedding sensitivity on test-set of MNIST (left), CIFAR10
(middle), CIFAR100 (right) datasets under PGD-L∞ attack. For each image, we computed the
normalized embedding sensitivity as ‖E(x)−E(x
′)‖2
‖E(x)‖2 . Plots show the median sensitivity over test-set
of each dataset. Error bars correspond to standard deviation.
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Figure A2: Comparison of robust accuracy of different methods against white-box attacks on MNIST
dataset with ResNet5 architecture.
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Figure A3: Comparison of robust accuracy of different methods against white-box attacks on
CIFAR10 dataset with ResNet18 architecture.
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Figure A4: Comparison of robust accuracy of different methods against white-box attacks on
CIFAR100 dataset with ResNet18 architecture.
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Figure A5: Comparison of robust accuracy of AFD and embedding matching against white-box
attacks on MNIST dataset with ResNet5 architecture.
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Figure A6: Scatter plot of 2-dimensional t-SNE projection [25] of the embedding derived from
training the ResNet5 architecture on MNIST dataset. (top row) t-SNE projection of embeddings of
clean images for networks trained with different methods. Each point corresponds to the embedding
of one of the images from the MNIST test-set. (rows 2 to 5) t-SNE projection of the embedding
of the clean and perturbed MNIST test-set images. Columns are sorted from left to right with the
strength of the perturbation (left-most column corresponds to clean images and right-most column
with highest tested perturbation). Perturbations are generated using PGD-L∞ attack. NT: naturally
trained; AT: adversarially trained[26]; TRADES: [52]; AFD: adversarial feature desensitization.
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Figure A7: Scatter plot of 2-dimensional t-SNE projection [25] of the embedding derived from
training the ResNet5 architecture on CIFAR10 dataset. (top row) t-SNE projection of embeddings of
clean images for networks trained with different methods. Each point corresponds to the embedding
of one of the images from the CIFAR10 test-set. (rows 2 to 5) t-SNE projection of the embedding
of the clean and perturbed CIFAR10 test-set images. Columns are sorted from left to right with the
strength of the perturbation (left-most column corresponds to clean images and right-most column
with highest tested perturbation). NT: naturally trained; AT: adversarially trained[26]; TRADES:
[52];AFD: adversarial feature desensitization.
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Figure A8: Scatter plot of 2-dimensional t-SNE projection [25] of the embedding derived from
training the ResNet5 architecture on CIFAR100 dataset. (top row) t-SNE projection of embeddings of
clean images for networks trained with different methods. Each point corresponds to the embedding
of one of the images from the CIFAR100 test-set. (rows 2 to 5) t-SNE projection of the embedding of
the clean and perturbed CIFAR100 test-set images. Columns are sorted from left to right with the
strength of the perturbation (left-most column corresponds to clean images and right-most column
with highest tested perturbation). NT: naturally trained; AT: adversarially trained [26]; TRADES
[52]; AFD: adversarial feature desensitization.
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